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In Austin, Minnesota worker from UFCW Local P-9 takes note ofHormel's 
recent "consistent profitability." 
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Corporate Campaigns: 
A Wobbly-Bred 
Campaign 
in Minnesota 
Ken Gagala 
In December 1984 Local P-9 of the United Food and Commercial 
Workers (UFCWj launched a "corporate campaign" to restore wage 
cuts imposed by the George A. Hormel Company. While the 
campaign continues today, it has not succeeded in restoring the 
wage cuts. The origin and strategy of the campaign, the obstacles 
confronting it, and an assessment of the campaign are contained 
in this article. 
Wobbly Bred 
Austin is a town of 23,000 on the southern Minnesota prairie, 
amid corn and soybean fields. A quarter of Austin's workforce is 
employed by the George A. Hormel Company. Started in 1891 as 
a meatpacking house employing six men, the company has grown 
to be the 240th largest on the Fortune 500. With its corporate 
headquarters and largest plant in Austin, Hormel is a profitable 
company in an industry devastated by bankruptcies and plant 
closings. 
George A. Hormel and his son, Jay C, ran the company, both 
before and after unionization in 1933, as a "benevolent dictatorship." 
•Ken Gagala is a professor in the Labor Education Service of the Industrial Relations 
Center at the University of Minnesota. 
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In this environment of enlightened management, an enlightened 
union movement emerged. An itinerant butcher named Frank Ellis 
came to Austin in 1929 and got a job as a foreman. In a position 
to hire, Frank chose like-minded men of similar character-
members of the Industrial Workers of the World. Salted throughout 
the plant, the Wobblies went quietly about the business of 
organizing workers. 
In 1933, the Independent Union of all Workers (IUAW) was 
formed, with the objective to "enlist all workers and farmers into 
one great union." The IUAW proceeded to organize other Iowa 
and Minnesota meatpackers and to assist workers at organizing 
other businesses in Austin. In May 1937, the IUAW voted to join 
the newly formed Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), and 
in 1939, became Local 9 of the United Packinghouse Worker's of 
America (UPWA). Today, it is Local P-9 of the United Food and 
Commercial Workers (UFCW). 
In 1940 Hormel and P-9 negotiated a permanent agreement with 
no expiration date. When UPWA locals around the country went 
on strike, P-9 and Hormel agreed to continue working and to adopt 
any improvements gained at other meatpackers. On these 
occasions, P-9 members assessed themselves 10% of wages to 
support striking UPWA members. Since 1933, P-9 members have 
never struck. 
Hard Times for P-9 
P-9's membership fell from a peak of 4,000 in the early 1950s 
to 800 by the mid-1970s. Furthermore, as Hormel expanded its 
operations elsewhere, the multi-story Austin plant became 
outmoded. Finally in 1978, Hormel announced it would close its 
Austin operation unless the local could make conditions right for 
the company to build a modern facility there. 
Concessions were made amidst tremendous pressure from the 
local community. In return for Hormel's agreement to build a 
state-of-the-art pork slaughtering and packing plant in Austin, P-9 
agreed to an eight-year contract which increased production 
quotas and established a two-tier wage system. Senior employees 
were given approximately $120 per week as compensation for 
agreeing to relinquish an incentive program, while new hires at 
the modern plant—the majority of P-9 today—did not receive these 
payments. But it was the "me too" clause tying the local's wages 
and benefits to the industry pattern that would later come back 
to haunt the workers. 
In the 1980s, the industry pattern of $10.69 per hour was broken 
in a wave of plant closings, bankruptcies, and sales— with many 
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Jim Guyette, President of Local P-9, speaks to rally in December of 1984. 
firms reopening nonunion. In October 1983, Hormel threatened 
to follow the pattern. After P-9 filed for arbitration, an arbitrator 
ruled that Hormel could not cut wages until Oscar Mayer and 
Company reached agreement with the UFCW at two of its plants. 
Ultimately in October 1984, Hormel imposed a 25% wage cut on 
P-9, from $10.69 to $8.25. 
In September 1984, just prior to the October 1984 cut of P-9's 
wages, Hormel and the UFCW negotiated a contract covering its 
six other plants, raising wages to $9 immediately and to $10 in 
September 1985, the highest rates in the industry. Hormel 
extended the offer to P-9, and the local's executive board accepted, 
but the offer was rejected overwhelmingly by the membership. 
In December, 1984, while workers continued to work under 
contract, P-9 launched its "corporate campaign" for full restoration 
of the cut. 
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P-9's Corporate Campaign 
In order to wage struggle against Hormel, P-9 president Jim 
Guyette invited Corporate Campaign Inc.'s Ray Rogers to come 
to Austin. Best known for his efforts on behalf of ACTWU's 
organizing campaign at J.R Stevens, Rogers came to Austin on 
December 9, 1984, to unveil a slide show to 2,000 P-9 supporters 
and a host of news reporters. 
Rogers planned to assail the connection between Hormel and 
First Bank Systems, a Minneapolis-based bank holding company 
(the U.S.' 17th largest), which owns 16.4% of Hormel's stock, has 
a director on Hormel's board, and "interlocks" by having Hormel 
managers on the board of two of the corporation's subsidiaries. 
Proposed tactics included conducting mass demonstrations at 
forthcoming Hormel and First Bank stockholder meetings, 
picketing and leafletting at First Bank branches, and urging unions 
to publicize their displeasure with the Hormel-First Bank 
connection. An outright call for a boycott of First Bank was not 
and could not be made lest Corporate Campaigns Inc. and P-9 be 
found guilty of a secondary boycott. 
The cost of the campaign was estimated to be $340,000 for the 
first six months of 1985. Corporate Campaigns Inc. would receive 
$160,000 from P-9 directly and the local would incur costs of 
$180,000 for printing, transportation, and other organizing costs. 
If successful at restoring the wage cut, Corporate Campaigns could 
earn up to $200,000 in performance bonuses in addition to the 
$160,000 fee. On January 17, 1985, the membership of P-9 voted 
a dues assessment of $3 per week to pay for the campaign. 
Obstacles 
P-9's membership could not have anticipated the obstacles its 
campaign would encounter. Not only did the UFCW fail to support 
the campaign, it worked against the effort. UFCW Packinghouse 
locals, including those at the six other Hormel plants, voted not 
to support the campaign. AFL-CIO central bodies and locals in 
Minnesota were informed that P-9's action was unauthorized. In 
April, UFCW ruled that the vote authorizing P-9's assessment was 
invalid. 
The campaign's greatest support came in Duluth, where the 
building trade unions informed First Bank of their displeasure over 
the treatment Hormel had accorded P-9. Support in First Bank's 
home base, Minneapolis-St. Paul, was negligible, however, and 
there is little evidence that unions withdrew funds from First Bank 
because of the corporate campaign. 
Hormel went 
majority 
charitable 
to promote 
this 
move its 530-
response to the 
Furthermore, 
annual stockhol 
meant that P-9's 
in Austin had 
supporters had t 
Georgia. 
Because it op< 
move productio: 
Hormel announ 
FDL Foods Inc. 
"whipsaw" the 
While putting 
cultivate comm 
prime time on tl 
annual meetin; 
present the cor 
campaign succi 
paying off: the s 
two members o: 
to end its cam| 
When P-9 hac 
of 1984, it had j 
from Austin to 
meeting in Apr 
March, an arbit 
1985. As a resui 
Bank meeting. 
The fact that 
implications, fc 
locals were to r 
less than what ] 
and the arbitrs 
Nevertheless 
margin a propo: 
Hormel plants, 
assess themse 
campaign. 
A Wobbiy-bred Campaign 85 
Hormel went on the offensive to an unanticipated extent. The 
majority stockholder of Hormel (45.7%), is the non-profit, 
charitable Hormel Foundation. Its by-laws require the foundation 
to promote company management interested in the "welfare of 
this community [Austin]." Nevertheless, Hormel threatened to 
move its 530-person corporate headquarters from Austin in 
response to the union's campaign. 
Furthermore, for the first time in 93 years, Hormel moved its 
annual stockholders meeting away from Austin. Hormel's move 
meant that P-9's plan to demonstrate at the stockholders meeting 
in Austin had to be cancelled. Instead, 30 P-9 members and 
supporters had to travel 29 hours by bus to the meeting in Atlanta, 
Georgia. 
Because it operates six plants outside of Austin, Hormel could 
move production and thereby "whipsaw" P-9. Furthermore, when 
Hormel announced plans at its stockholders meeting to link with 
FDL Foods Inc., an Iowa-based packer, it increased its ability to 
"whipsaw" the embattled local. 
While putting pressure on the union, Hormel took care to 
cultivate community support. The company bought an hour of 
prime time on the local ABC-TV affiliate a week before the January 
annual meeting. A question-and-answer format was used to 
present the company's position that layoffs would occur if the 
campaign succeeded. By May it was clear that this effort was 
paying off: the seven-member Austin City Council, which included 
two members of Local P-9, voted unanimously to call on the union 
to end its campaign. 
When P-9 had voted to begin its campaign, back in December 
of 1984, it had planned a 5,000-car caravan traveling the 125 miles 
from Austin to Minneapolis for First Bank's annual stockholders 
meeting in April—provided that P-9 was by then on strike. But in 
March, an arbitrator ruled that P-9 could not strike before August 
1985. As a result, only 150 P-9 members demonstrated at the First 
Bank meeting. 
The fact that P-9 could not strike until August had important 
implications, for by then UFCW members at Hormel's six other 
locals were to receive wage boosts to $10 per hour—just 69 cents 
less than what P-9 was demanding. Between Hormel management 
and the arbitration decision, Local P-9 found itself boxed in. 
Nevertheless, on June 2, local members rejected by a 4 to 1 
margin a proposal to negotiate an agreement similar to that at other 
Hormel plants. Eleven days later, the unionists voted 2 to 1 to 
assess themselves $3 per week to continue the corporate 
campaign. 
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Assessment of the Corporate Campaign 
P-9 might have fared better if the UFCW had supported the 
campaign and Hormel's opposition had been less aggressive. But 
even in those circumstances, the union's success was not assured. 
P-9 had chosen to try to pressure Hormel through its corporate 
ties, rather than through a primary boycott, because its members 
were not on strike, and therefore would have hurt themselves by 
boycotting. But the tactic of attempting to influence the decision 
of targets by exerting pressure on the corporations with whom 
targets have interlocking directorships is limited. John Kenneth 
Galbraith observes: 
(I)t is fifty years since the pioneering scholars Adolf A. 
Berle Jr. and Gardner C. Means concluded that in the 
majority of the largest two hundred corporations in the 
United States control had passed to the management, 
which is to say the managers elected the board of 
directors, which then, in an incestuous way, selected the 
management that had selected them. (Anatomy of Power, 
1983, p. 133) 
Since seven of the twelve members of Hormel's board of 
directors are members of the company's management, the board 
is a rubber stamp for management actions. Moreover, Hormel is 
more incestuous than most corporations. The non-profit, 
charitable Hormel Foundation, the majority stockholder, also has 
a contingent of Hormel managers on its board. Therefore, the 
foundation's failure to intercede on behalf of the P-9 is not 
surprising, because following the industry pattern is certainly 
portrayed and accepted as promoting the "welfare of this 
community." First Bank, the second largest stockholder, became 
the alternative secondary target almost by default. 
In order to assess the campaign's likelihood of success, let us 
assume that P-9 had been able to sever the Hormel-First Bank 
connection. Would the campaign then have succeeded? 
Probably not. Hormel, according to First Bank, has no long-term 
debt outstanding with the bank. Instead, Hormel issues 
commercial paper. Moreover, even if First Bank did hold long-term 
debt of Hormel, it could sell its Hormel loans outstanding to a 
wide variety of financial institutions, thereby diffusing P-9's efforts 
to single out a secondary target—a "whipsaw" of sorts. 
Hormel's checking or "current" account with First Bank might 
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of a customer with $500 million in assets would have an 
appreciable effect on a bank with $21 billion in assets. Even then, 
it is uncertain as to what proportion of Hormel's checking account 
activity is in fact conducted through First Bank, because First Bank 
is concentrated in the Midwest and Hormel operates nationwide. 
According to First Bank, the 16.4% of Hormel stock to which 
it holds title is in pension funds, which it manages for Hormel 
employees. The bank claims to have a voting interest in 6% of 
the stock, while Hormel employees vote and control the rest. 
If First Bank owned the Hormel stock outright, it could sell that 
stock at the going market rate. First Bank might lose the 
opportunity of owning part of a company with a bright future, 
but it could reinvest the sales proceeds elsewhere in assets with 
perhaps equally bright futures. While Hormel may be the most 
profitable firm in the meatpacking industry, its return on 
stockholder's equity is far from spectacular—about equal to a 
savings certificate at the local bank. Its return on equity was 10.6% 
in 1983 and 10.4% in 1984. Median return on equity for the 
Fortune 500 was 10.7% in 1983 and 13.6% in 1984. 
If, in fact, First Bank is merely the administrator of Hormel 
pension funds, severing the Hormel First Bank connection would 
cost the bank its administrative fee for performing this function. 
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But who is the loser in this transaction—First Bank or Hormel? 
Furthermore, could the lone First Bank representative persuade 
the seven Hormel managers on the corporate board to rescind the 
wage cut when the firm's 1984 return on equity was below the 
median for Fortune 500 firms? 
Pressuring or forcing secondary targets to sever their ties with 
primary targets does not always resolve disputes. Severing the 
Avon Products and Manufacturers Hanover connections did not 
resolve the J.P. Stevens dispute. Pressure on Stevens' primary 
financial backer, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, did. 
Direct pressure on important funding sources of primary targets 
seems to be the most successful tactic. 
If one looks at the multi-union corporate campaign against 
Beverly nursing homes, one finds there are other ways to exert 
financial pressure on target companies. In that instance, the 
union's ability to keep Beverly from expanding its operations by 
challenging the quality of its patient care before government 
regulatory agencies had an impact. Also, Minnesota building trade 
unions have had success by challenging before government 
housing agencies the quality of construction by non-union 
contractors. 
Given the fact that Hormel was not dependent on the Austin 
plant, that the UFCW did not support Local P-9, and that Hormel 
was not dependent on one source of funding, it is not surprising 
that the corporate campaign failed to restore the wage cuts. 
Nevertheless, other unions can learn much from P-9's experience. 
The local was correct in planning its actions against Hormel 
before the company implemented its full attack on the union. It 
was also right on the mark in keeping the members at work while 
the campaign took place. One might also argue that the decision 
to hire a union consultant to conduct the campaign was the right 
way to go. After all, the $340,000 P-9 spent on the campaign 
(assuming no performance bonuses) works out to $200 per 
member. Not a bad investment in an effort to reverse a wage cut 
costing each member $100 per week. 
P-9's strategy does not look bad compared to what other unions 
have done in similarly dire situations: call a hopeless strike; 
announce a corporate caixipaign after a strike is all but lost; or 
begin a campaign after the employer has reopened a plant 
nonunion and undercut industry wages (the UFCW was actually 
forced to do this at Armour). 
Corporate campaigns clearly don't work in every situation. But 
for a strong and militant local, like P-9 in Austin, Minnesota, they 
may be worth taking a chance on. • 
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Editor's Note: 
Ken Gagala's article, "A Wobbly-Bred Campaign in 
Minnesota," covers only the first stage of the corporate 
campaign UFCW Local P-9 has mounted against the George 
A. Hormel Company. 
In late August, as we were going to press, the membership 
overwhelmingly voted to strike Hormel. With the strike, P-9 
intensified and expanded its campaign, with hundreds of P-9 
workers carrying their message directly to sister locals and 
other unionists in several states. As we go to press, they have 
deepened their struggle against the wage cut Hormel has 
imposed on them and have established themselves as a 
lightning rod in the fight against concessions. 
